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Abstract 
This research is aimed at determining the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure while 
the impact of this relationship on value of the firm using the panel data of selected Nigerian large non financial 
firms was also investigated. A contrasting relationship was observed between capital structure and the firm’s 
performance while Nigerian firm’s capital structure was dominated by short term leverage.  Leverage was 
negatively related to return on assets, number of board meetings and the board size while it was positively 
related to board composition. It was also observed that firm’s performance was positively related to leverage, 
number of board meetings and board size while it was negatively related to board composition. 
Key words: Capital structure, Value of the firm, Leverage, Corporate governance.  
 
1.0             Introduction 
This research was aimed at investigating the relationship between capital structure and the ownership structure of 
large industrial firms in Nigeria with special interest on the effect of this relationship on the firm’s performance 
for the period between 2008 and 2012. The pecking order theory assumed that the manager tend to protect the 
investor with the use of debt that could lead to increase in the firm’s value. On this premise, there is therefore a 
need to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the performance of the firm.  
The concept of Capital structure explained how the firm’s activities are financed using the combinations of debt 
and equity to optimise the value of the firm. The controversy relating to the concept of capital structure and the 
value of the firm was triggered by the paper presented by Modigliani and Miller (1958) that was entitled “the 
cost of capital, corporate finance and the theory of investment” however they concluded that the value of the 
firm is irrelevant to the determination of the value of the firm, though this conclusion was based on an unrealistic 
assumption of perfect financial market conditions. The academic discourse and controversy generated from the 
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958,1963)  lead to the developments of the main theories of capital structure, 
prominent among these theories were , Trade- off theory of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) , Pecking order 
theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) , Agency theory of Jenson and Meckling (1976) and the Market timing 
theory of graham and Harvey (2001). 
The performance of the firm could determine the investor’s interest in the firm, and  corporate governance also 
could play a moderating role on the Managers and their activities. As a result of the importance of corporate 
governance, it can play a role in the protection of the  and  interest of the stakeholders and the best that of the 
firm. Rocca (2007) observed that capital structure could motivate corporate governance efficiency while the 
firm’s ability to create value is also protected, she concluded that corporate governance has a mediation role 
between the capital structure and the value of the firm.  
There has been abundance of studies on capital structure in the developed economies with little done in 
developing countries generally and in particular Africa. The few research work done in this area in Nigeria was 
concentrated on the static capital structure   of the trade-off theory, therefore there is need to adopt a more robust  
and complex dynamic capital structure research that will help the investors and other stake holders to appreciate 
the impact of corporate governance on the performance of the firm. 
The major research on capital structure in Nigeria was done by Salawu (2007) using a panel data of 50 non-
financial companies, though the methodology was a positivist approach but the attention was on the static trade-
off theory , while other studies  by Salawu and Agboola (2008), Akinyemi and Olagunju (2013) also examined 
how the capital structure determinants was explained by trade –off theory . Equally, Ajeigbe et al (2013) also 
tested the trade off theory of manufacturing firms in Nigeria. In view of the focus of the previous studies , we 
observed that the important relationship between capital structure and ownership structure , on one hand and the 
effect of this relation on the performance of the firm on the other hands, have not been given particular attention, 
hence the necessity for the current study.. 
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 Next section state the objective of the study, section three is the review of existing literature to establish the 
theoretical basis of the study, section four is the review of the research strategy used and model formulation, 
section five of the study is the analysis based on the formulated model while the last section is the conclusion. 
2.0 Statement of Research Objectives  
This research study was based on the following objectives; 
• To evaluate the relationship between capital structure and the ownership structure of industrial firms in 
Nigeria. 
• To determine the effect of ownership structure on the value of the firm 
3.0 Literature Review 
Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958) seminar paper triggered the controversy and research interest that lead to 
the level of academic  discussions  on the subject of capital structure, this ground-breaking study marked a major 
challenge to the traditional school’s opinion about the impact of cost of capital on leverage. They concluded that 
based on the assumption of perfect market for financial services the market value of the firm is independent of 
the leverage, that means the capital structure does not affect the firms value and that the value of the firm remain 
constant over various level of leverage. 
As a result of controversy generated by the M&M proposition and the critical academic evaluation that followed 
, especially the assumption of perfect financial market and that the tax effect was not relevant to the effect of the 
leverage level on the value of the firm, with due consideration for the academic critic and evaluation of their 
earlier work,  Modigliani and Miller however published the corrected version of this research paper in 1963. 
 Modigliani and Miller (1963) realised that some of the conditions upon which their proposition was based could 
be unrealistic therefore they tried to relax some of the assumptions, particularly the assumption of free and 
competitive financial market, they observed that the debt financing do have tax advantage since debt servicing is 
tax deductable which could lead to a drastic decrease in the cost of capital, they however concluded that firm 
should not take the tax advantage to the extreme because too high debt could have a negative impact on the value 
of the firm in the long run, therefore the use of retained earnings was believed to  be relevant especially when the 
limitations imposed by lenders that affect cost is taken into consideration. 
Maghyereh (2005) reviewed the historical perspective of the capital structure and the academic critic that follow 
the presentation of Modigliani and Miller that the value of the firm is constant at different leverage level which 
means that the value of the firm is not affected  by the choice of finance, Maghyereh however disagree with the 
M&M hypothesis as irrelevant to the real life situation and that the assumptions were unrealistic and wrong, he 
then concluded that the M&M conclusion is not consistent with today’s reality as there can not be an existence of 
a perfect market, he then concluded that the value of the firm is significantly influenced by the leverage level and 
the capital structure, this conclusion was based partly on the observation that the banks are not willing to lend to 
firms with high proportion of debt in their capital structure due to the high risk that is associated with the high 
geared firms. 
Carpentier (2006) critically evaluated the M&M hypothesis, the study was based on the proposition that the 
changes in leverage level does not influence the value of the firm, he however used the pecking order theory to 
determine the long-run effect of leverage level changes, in support of M&M hypothesis he observed that the 
relationship between the leverage level and the value of the firm was not significant enough to reject the null 
hypothesis. It was observed that the samples used for this research comprises of firms of different stages either 
moving away from or moving toward the target or optimal capital structure, this could lead to increase in the 
level of bias in the research process and the assumption of static equilibrium that the target capital structure is 
constant, this indicates that changes in the target leverage level was ignored contrary to the findings of 
Hovakimian et al (2001) and Frank and Goyal (2003) that asserted that value of the firm depends on the firm’s 
stage, whether the firm’s moving away from the target capital or moving toward optimal level, this was 
supported by the research findings of kaya (2011). 
Booth et al  (2001) discovered that there are conflicts between the stakeholders in a firm, the manager in term of 
their expected benefits, they observed that there is  agency cost of the manager’s choice of finance between the 
use of debt financing or equity financing, the use of debt financing could have the consequence of a debt 
overhang, this was consistent with the work of , Jenson and Mecking (1976). 
The study of capital structure have become  scientific with the shift of emphasis to the more systemic and 
behavioural view of the firm and the  use  of positivist approach for the study of the capital structure dynamics.  
Rocca (2007) observed that the character of the firm is a factor that must be seriously considered as determinants 
of the capital structure, the importance of the firm’s characteristics was however supported by Sheikh and wang 
(2008), Makherjee and Mahakud (2010) and Oded et al (2011). 
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Eriotis et al (2007) observed that the financial welfare of the firm depends on its financing decision and that 
inappropriate capital structure decision may lead to financial distress that could even lead to bankruptcy with the 
associated distress cost. 
A recent development is the examination of the relationship between the capital structure and ownership 
structure with the associating impact on corporate governance and the value of the firm this is a major deviation 
from the traditional finance field of capital structure. 
Rocca(2007) asserted that there is an important link between the firm’s capital structure and the value of the 
firm, he then stated that corporate governance is a major determinant of capital structure, that corporate 
governance played a mediating role between the leverage level and the value of the firm, he emphasised that 
efficient corporate governance could be motivated by the capital structure, that the choice of financing is 
influenced by corporate governance, he concluded that firm make corporate governance decision that is aimed at 
using financing to reduce the information asymmetry problem. 
 A major development was when Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) extended the relationship between the capital 
structure and corporate governance to the emerging economies of sub Saharan Africa, to test the efficiency of the 
result of research conducted in western developed economies in an emerging economy of Africa, they however 
observed that the Jordanian firm demonstrated the same relationships as with what is obtained in the western 
developed countries, they discovered that capital structure is determined by profitability, growth rate, firm size, 
tangibility and liquidity. 
Driffield et al (2005) observed the existence of a strong relationship between the capital structure and the 
ownership structure, they argued that irrespective of whether this is family owned or not, an increase in 
ownership concentration is associated with increase in leverage level of the firm. This result was supported by 
the findings of Cespedes et al (2010) when they observed a positive relationship between leverage and 
ownership concentration. 
 Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) observed that the leverage level of a firm increased with the outside owners and 
that these group of investors promote the use of debt finance, in other word the use of leverage rather than 
equity, this result was supported by the results of Poyry and Maury (2012), Pindado and Ganguli(2012) 
Zeitum (2014) in the study of the effect of ownership concentration on performance of the firm in 5 GCC 
countries (Qatar , Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman) observed that ownership structure have some 
impact on the performance of the firm, that ownership structure affect performance positively and significantly, a 
firm’s capital structure has no effect on performance while the age and size of the firm have positive and 
significant effect on performance.  
Masood (2014) emphasised the importance of the capital structure decision when he argued that such decisions 
has serious repercussions not only on the stakeholders of the firm but also for the survival of the firm in the face 
of the increasing competitive business environments. He noted however, that despite various theories and 
research studies on capital structure the issue of capital structure remain unresolved. He then suggested some 
control structures that could optimised the value of the firm: 
1. The use of debt in the capital structure to control and curtail the sumptuous use of managerial incentives 
2. The use of managerial equity ownership to align the interest of the managers with the external owner’s 
interest. 
3. External block holders could be used as a pressure group to check the managerial excesses.  
Rajangan et al (2014) in a recent study of the impacts of corporate governance in Malaysia discovered that 
ownership structure and board size have impacts on the profitability and gearing while they concluded that 
the executive directors and independent directors have an impact on the gearing of the firm, and that the 
non-independent and non-executive directors seems not related with the performance indicators of the firm.  
4.0 Research Strategies 
Leverage is a major concept that is used to measure the capital structure, several scholars have attempted to 
define what leverage should be, however this study was based on Rajan and Zingales (1995) determination of 
leverage , therefore leverage will be defined as the proportion of total asset to total capital while total capital will 
be defined as the addition of total debt and the total equity of the firm at a particular period. 
This research  involved the construction of an empirical framework for the study of   the target capital using OSL 
to evaluate the basic relationship between leverage and the ownership structure based on panel data of Nigerian 
manufacturing industry. 
The research was based on the data from all the active non financial companies listed in the NSE 30, which is the 
biggest 30 firms listed in Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), to reduce the level of bias with the research process 
only companies with continuous data for the period covered in the research was included,  firms that do not have 
annual report and financial statement for the period under investigation was excluded from this study.  
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The analysis was done using the econometric tool of Eviews, while the research period was 2008 to 2012, the 
period 2008 was picked to avoid the structural break the 2008 financial recession could bring to the research 
process. 
The empirical framework for the critical examination of the capital structure and ownership structure on one 
hand and the firm’s performance, the fixed effect target capital model will be constructed based on the 
Myer(1984), Rajan and Zingales (1995) Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1998) and Cotei (2011)  
The fixed effect model is used to determine the target leverage that will optimize the value of the firm. 
LEVit   = ai  + RXi t-1 …………………………………                 ……(1)  
ROAit  = ai  + RXi t-1 ……………………………………                 …(2) 
Where Xi t-1 is the vector of observed firm characteristics, that is the independent variables, the total debt will be 
regressed against the firm characteristics based on the trade-off theory .  
Model 1 
LEVit  =  αi  + ß1ROA t-1  + ß2Bsize t-1  + ß3Bcomp t-1 + ß4Bmeet t-1 + Et        …………(3) 
Model 2 
ROAit   =  αi  + ß1Lev t-1  + ß3Bsize t-1  + ß4Bcomp t-1 + ß5Bmeet t-1 + Et        …………(4) 
Where: 
LEV is the total leverage which is the measure of the firm’s capital structure 
ROA is return on assets , these is the measure of firm’s performance 
Bsize is the Board size, measured by the total number of directors of the firm 
Bcomp is board composition, measured by the percentage of independent directors to the total board directors of 
the firm. 
Bmeet is number of board meetings measured by number of times the board meet during the year.  
 
4.0 Analysis and Findings 
This research analysis was base on the adoption of fixed and the partial adjustment model to illustrate the 
relation between the tested variables, a single definition of total leverage was used for the measurement of 
capital structure while two dependent variables; Leverage and Return on Assets were used and regressed with 
the independent variables for the determination of the relations that subsist between the variables using the 
formulated models. 
 
 LEV LEVLT LEVST BCOMP BMEET  
 Mean  0.634590  0.161432  0.486504  0.537788  4.437500  
 Median  0.641404  0.122664  0.443658  0.538000  4.000000  
 Maximum  0.998638  0.829641  0.898602  0.833000  6.000000  
 Minimum  0.264500  0.000000  0.142747  0.110000  3.000000  
 Std. Dev.  0.154994  0.139196  0.163227  0.192077  0.793067  
 Skewness -0.113349  1.871036  0.669944 -0.440426  0.589552  
 Kurtosis  2.627604  8.363277  2.920538  2.466913  2.741545  
       
 Jarque-Bera  0.633567  2.5595  6.005387  3.533606  4.856944  
 Probability  0.028488  0.000000  0.049653  0.170878  0.088171  
       
 Sum  50.76724  12.91457  38.92035  43.02300  355.0000  
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.897816  1.530672  2.104813  2.914581  4.968750  
       
 Observations  80  80  80  80  80  
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                                              BSIZE ROA 
                               Mean                                    10.16250  0.159997 
                               Median                                  10.00000  0.131291 
                              Maximum                              16.00000  1.291160 
 Minimum                              6.000000 -0.015044 
                              Std. Dev                                2.302688  0.160693 
                             Skewness                             -0.074647  4.488876 
    Kurtosis                             2.469795  3.183685 
  
Jarque-Bera                          1.011356  3.040546 
Probability                               0.603097  0.000000 
  
                              Sum                                      813.0000  12.79973 
Sum Sq. Dev.                       4.188875  2.039962 
  
                                     80  80 
 
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Table 1 is the descriptive statistics of the observed variables, leverage has a mean of 0.63 with the median of 
0.64 which indicates that leverage has a fair distribution and that leverage is an important component of capital 
structure in Nigeria. However the mean of ROA is 0.15 while the median is 0.13 which also show fair 
distribution. The gap between the maximum and minimum for both leverage and ROA are high but acceptable 
considering the distribution. The test of normality was done using the Skewness and Kurtosis. It was also 
observed that leverage was largely dominated with the short term leverage which could be as a result of the stage 
of  financial market development that could make it difficult for firms to raise long term fund hence the firms 
mostly financed their activities using short term finance. 
Dependent Variable: LEV   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/31/14   Time: 20:28   
Sample: 2008 2012   
Included observations: 80   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.330809 0.132081 7.047243 0.0000 
ROA -0.236352 0.114895 -0.316391 0.0526 
BCOMP 0.201729 0.096900 0.017846 0.0858 
BMEET -0.153184 0.021761 -2.443934 0.0169 
BSIZE -0.205445 0.007556 -0.720612 0.1734 
     
     R-squared 0.586941    Mean dependent var 0.634590 
Adjusted R-squared 0.438244    S.D. dependent var 0.154994 
S.E. of regression 0.152001    Akaike info criterion -0.869400 
Sum squared resid 1.732818    Schwarz criterion -0.720524 
Log likelihood 3.977602    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.809712 
F-statistic 1.785362    Durbin-Watson stat 1.891655 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.140652    
     
     Table 2 illustrating the relation between leverage and the ownership structure of the firm 
Table 2 above is the regression analysis of the relation between the dependent and independent variables, 
leverage is negatively related with return on asset, number of board meetings and the board size while there is a 
positive regression between leverage and board composition. This result is statistically significant based on the 
value of probabilities and F-statistics. However this finding is accepted as valid based on the 0.58 value of R2   
 
 
 
 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.15, 2014 
 
87 
.This result is contrary to the findings of Ganguli (2012) while the observed negative relation between leverage 
and return on asset supported the proposition of the trade off theory and the findings of Rajangan et al (2014) 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/18/14   Time: 19:23   
Sample: 2008 2012   
Included observations: 80   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LEV 0.487602 0.090477 0.968222 0.0360 
BCOMP -0.266171 0.087619 -3.037825 0.0033 
BMEET 0.324749 0.015953 1.551364 0.0250 
BSIZE 0.213264 0.006924 1.915598 0.0592 
     
     R-squared 0.510750    Mean dependent var 0.159997 
Adjusted R-squared 0.475648    S.D. dependent var 0.160693 
S.E. of regression 0.154496    Akaike info criterion -0.848595 
Sum squared resid 1.814037    Schwarz criterion -0.729494 
Log likelihood 3.794380    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.800844 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.870394    
     
     Table 3 illustrating the relation between firm’s ownership structure and the financial 
performance of the firm 
Table 3 show that return on asset is positively related to leverage, number of board meeting and the board size, 
while return on asset is negatively related to the board composition, this result could be considered valid based 
on the values of the probabilities, F-statistics and R2 . This result agree with the definition of corporate 
governance given by Gillan and Starks (1998) while it also support the findings of Rajangan et al (2014) and 
Zeitum (2014) 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
The result of this research study that the firm’s financial performance is positively related to leverage, the 
number of board meeting and board size while it is negatively related to the composition of the board indicate 
that corporate governance have impact on the financial performance of the firm. This was consistent with the 
findings of Zeitum (2014) and Rajangan et at (2014). However it was observed that there was a substantial 
relation between capital structure and the corporate governance with its implications on the agency cost 
problems that is faced by the firm. 
A contrast relation was discovered between capital structure and the firms performance , while firm’s 
performance affect the capital structure negatively , interestingly capital structure affect firm’s performance 
positively therefore each of the two variables is a determinant of  each other. 
It was observed that most firms that was selected for the study did not perceive corporate governance as 
described by Shleifer and Vshny (1997) and Gillan and Starks (1998) , these firms considered corporate 
governance as mere statutory requirements therefore they only provide corporate governance information to 
meet legal requirements of corporate governance minimum discosure and not because of the benefit of such 
information. 
Firms should therefore take the issue of corporate governance more seriously and not just a requirement of the 
law but based on proper understanding of the importance of corporate governance as a way of protecting the 
interest of the firm’s stakeholders and the overall best interest of the firm. 
This research was limited to the sixteen large non-financial firms listed in the Nigerian Stock exchange, there is 
need for a more embracing study that will include all the non- financial firms that is listed in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange to reduce the problem of bias that is associated with generalisation of findings. There is also the need 
to exploit the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of firms performance in Nigeria.   
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Correlation 
 
 LEV BCOMP BMEET BSIZE ROA ROE 
LEV  1.000000  0.034467 -0.280276 -0.104865 -0.056083  0.265202 
BCOMP  0.034467  1.000000 -0.100346  0.105285 -0.359080  0.107416 
BMEET -0.280276 -0.100346  1.000000  0.078413  0.042186 -0.087542 
BSIZE -0.104865  0.105285  0.078413  1.000000  0.075972 -0.051070 
ROA -0.056083 -0.359080  0.042186  0.075972  1.000000  0.001475 
ROE  0.265202  0.107416 -0.087542 -0.051070  0.001475  1.000000 
 
 
